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Note
SECOND WIND:
A LEGAL AND POLICY-BASED EVALUATION OF THE BLOCK ISLAND
WIND FARM AND THE LEGISLATION THAT SAVED IT
BRIAN M. GIBBONS
Rhode Island has recently attempted to pioneer offshore wind energy
development by passing new legislation and partnering with Deepwater
Wind, LLC to develop a wind farm off Block Island. This wind farm will
have long-term implications, both as a demonstration project for future
offshore wind energy, and as a paradigm for governmental expedition of
renewable energy projects.
In support of this project, Rhode Island passed aggressive new
legislation that severely constrained the discretion of the Public Utilities
Commission in deciding whether a contract between Deepwater Wind and
National Grid was “commercially reasonable.” The resulting controversy
underscores the importance of maintaining competition between renewable
energy firms in order to avoid allegations of favoritism and neglect of
constituent ratepayers.
This Note traces the still-developing history of the Block Island Wind
Farm, along with its accompanying legal challenges, controversies, and
stakeholder perspectives, in order to extract the lessons that can be applied
in future renewable energy development. The primary lesson that emerges
is the political and economic price of circumventing the regulatory process
through legislation that advantages one particular company.
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SECOND WIND:
A LEGAL AND POLICY-BASED EVALUATION OF THE BLOCK ISLAND
WIND FARM AND THE LEGISLATION THAT SAVED IT
BRIAN M. GIBBONS∗
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, Rhode Island has attempted to jumpstart offshore wind
energy development by passing new legislation and partnering with
Deepwater Wind, LLC to develop a wind farm approximately three miles
southwest of Block Island. This wind farm will have long-term
implications as a model for future offshore wind farm development in the
northeastern United States. Deepwater Wind is already planning a “second
generation” of large-scale offshore wind farms,1 and other companies may
well decide to enter the market in the near future if the Block Island Wind
Farm is successful.
In 2009, the project stalled when the Rhode Island Public Utilities
Commission (“PUC”) declared that the Power Purchase Agreement
(“PPA”) between Deepwater Wind and distributor National Grid was not
“commercially reasonable” in accordance with applicable legislation.2 In
response, Rhode Island passed new legislation that redefined the term
“commercially reasonable” and effectively forced the PUC to approve an
updated, but nearly identical contract.3 Currently, the project is moving
through the permitting process, and is expected to be completed in 2015.4
The significantly higher cost of wind energy and the perceived
favoritism to one company has made Rhode Island’s renewable energy
policy widely controversial. This Note explores the legal, legislative, and
regulatory path the Block Island Wind Farm has traveled since its
inception through present day. It begins with a history of the Wind Farm
in Part II, before delving into more intricate legal analysis in Part III.
The Block Island Wind Farm itself is a relatively small, local project
with short-term consequences that can be predicted and analyzed. Part IV
∗
University of Connecticut School of Law, J.D. Candidate 2014; Elon University, B.S. 2009;
Block Island School, Valedictorian 2005.
1
Deepwater Wind Energy Center, DEEPWATER WIND, http://dwwind.com/dww-energycenter/deepwater-wind-energy-center-overview (last visited Jan. 22, 2013) [hereinafter Deepwater
Wind Energy Center]; Hudson Canyon Wind Farm, DEEPWATER WIND, http://dwwind.com/hudsoncanyon/hudson-canyon-project-overview (last visited Jan. 22, 2013).
2
In re Proposed Town of New Shoreham Project, 25 A.3d 482, 492−93 (R.I. 2011).
3
Id. at 494−96.
4
Stephanie Turaj, Deepwater Completion Pushed to 2015, BLOCK ISLAND TIMES (Dec. 16, 2012),
http://block-island.villagesoup.com/p/deepwater-completion-pushed-to-2015/937011.
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of this Note explores the immediately discernible costs and benefits of the
project from the perspective of different stakeholders.
Beyond the short-term consequences, the controversy and litigation
surrounding the Block Island Wind Farm provide lessons applicable to
future renewable energy development. A crucial question is whether the
Rhode Island government’s official sponsorship and aggressive, narrowly
tailored legislation should serve as a model for other states. The Note
concludes by evaluating the policies underlying Rhode Island’s legislative
and executive actions.
II. HISTORY OF THE DEEPWATER WIND BLOCK ISLAND WIND FARM
The wind power initiative in Rhode Island began in January 2006,
when then-Governor Donald Carcieri announced a plan to supply 15% of
the state’s electricity demand from wind energy.5 Two years later, Rhode
Island solicited proposals from private developers to construct, finance,
and operate a large-scale offshore wind farm.6
State officials selected Deepwater Wind in September 2008 to finance
and build a wind farm.7 The company, which was only three-years old at
the time, beat out six other wind energy developers to gain exclusive rights
to develop a wind farm off the coast of Rhode Island.8 The company’s
plans for Rhode Island involve two separate stages: (1) a five-turbine
“demonstration-scale” wind farm located three miles southeast of Block
Island;9 and (2) a much larger Deepwater Wind Energy Center, composed
of 150 to 200 turbines located farther offshore, on the outer continental
shelf approximately 30 miles east of Long Island, 15 miles southeast of
Block Island, and 15 miles southwest of Martha’s Vineyard.10
While Rhode Island has not contributed any funding for the project, it
has worked to expedite the state and federal approval processes.11 Most
crucial to Deepwater’s success were identical House and Senate bills that
were signed into law by Governor Carcieri on June 26, 2009.12 The
legislation, effective July 1, 2010, required electric distribution companies
5

Timothy C. Barmann, Change in the Wind, PROVIDENCE J., Jan. 13, 2006, at F1.
Timothy C. Barmann, Wind Farm Gathers Steam—Rhode Island Seeks Private Partner for
Project, PROVIDENCE J., Apr. 4, 2008, at F1.
7
Timothy C. Barmann, N.J. Firm Picked to Build State’s Wind Farm, PROVIDENCE J., Sept. 25,
2008, at 1 [hereinafter Barmann, N.J. Firm Picked].
8
Id.
9
Block Island Wind Farm, DEEPWATER WIND, http://dwwind.com/block-island/block-islandproject-overview (last visited Jan. 25, 2013).
10
Deepwater Wind Energy Center, supra note 1.
11
See Chris Barrett, Deepwater Moves Ahead with Wind Farm, BLOCK ISLAND TIMES (Jan. 26,
2009), http://block-island.villagesoup.com/news/story/Deepwater-moves-ahead-with-wind-farm-Fiveto-eight-turbines-would-power-the-entire-island/88890 (“The state will provide no funding for the
project, but will help steer Deepwater through a host of state and federal approval processes.”).
12
In re Proposed Town of New Shoreham Project, 25 A.3d 482, 489 (R.I. 2011).
6
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to enter into long-term contracts to buy power from renewable energy
developers, provided that the developer’s proposals were “commercially
reasonable.”13 The law effectively gave Deepwater Wind a guaranteed
buyer for its electric power.14
Rhode Island’s largest electric utility company, National Grid, and
Deepwater Wind settled upon a PPA in December 2009.15 But the PUC
rejected the contract as not “commercially reasonable” under the 2009
legislation.16
In response, the Rhode Island General Assembly modified the
applicable statute with additional legislation.17 Under the new version of
the law, National Grid was specifically authorized to enter into a PPA on
terms consistent with the (rejected) 2009 agreement.18 The legislation also
delineated new factors for the Commission to apply in its review of an
amended PPA—factors that were written specifically to strip the
Commission of any authority to again reject the agreement.19 After taking
into account the new legislation, the PUC approved the amended PPA in
August 2010,20 and the Supreme Court of Rhode Island affirmed the
PUC’s approval in July of 2011.21
At the local level, Deepwater has gained approval for the
implementation of necessary research equipment,22 and the Block Island
Town Council has expressed support for the project in general.23 Most
13

R.I. GEN. LAWS § 39-26.1-3(a) (Supp. 2012).
Alex Kuffner, Law Clears Way for Wind, PROVIDENCE J., June 27, 2009, at 4.
15
Alex Kuffner, Utility to Buy Wind Farm’s Electricity, PROVIDENCE J., Dec. 10, 2009, at 1.
16
In re Proposed Town of New Shoreham Project, 25 A.3d at 492−93.
17
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 39-26.1-7(c) (Supp. 2012) (detailing the definition of what is to be
considered commercially reasonable); In re Proposed Town of New Shoreham Project, 25 A.3d at 494–
95 (noting that the General Assembly made amendments).
18
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 39-26.1-7(a) (Supp. 2012).
19
See id. § 39-26.1-7(c) (redefining “commercially reasonable” to “mean terms and pricing that
are reasonably consistent with what an experienced power market analyst would expect to see for a
project of similar size, technology, and location”). Moreover, the modified law explicitly requires that
the commission “shall approve” the PPA if it is “likely to . . . further development of Quonset Business
Park [where Deepwater planned to build parts of the turbines]” and if “[t]he amended power purchase
agreement is likely to provide environmental benefits, including the reduction of carbon emissions.”
Id.
20
In re Amended Power Purchase Agreement Between Narragansett Elec. Co. & Deepwater
Wind Block Island, 2010 WL 3458306, at *1 (R.I.P.U.C. Aug. 16, 2010).
21
In re Proposed Town of New Shoreham Project, 25 A.3d at 486.
22
Chris Barrett, Deepwater Seeks Weather Tower near North Light, BLOCK ISLAND TIMES (Feb.
17, 2009), http://block-island.villagesoup.com/news/story/Deepwater-seeks-weather-tower-near-NorthLight/88936.
23
Dan West, Council Supports Wind Farm Bill, BLOCK ISLAND TIMES (May 10, 2010),
http://block-island.villagesoup.com/news/story/Council-supports-wind-farm-bill/90852; Dan West,
Town Council Supports New Wind Contract, BLOCK ISLAND TIMES (July 12, 2010), http://blockisland.villagesoup.com/news/story/Town-Council-supports-new-wind-contract/91175; Dan West,
Council to Send Letter for Deepwater Loan Guarantee, BLOCK ISLAND TIMES (Sept. 20, 2010),
14
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importantly, Deepwater Wind has received planning board and zoning
board approval for the substation necessary to provide Block Island with
electricity.24
Deepwater still needs approval from the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers, which recently extended its comment period through February
10, 2013.25 The state Coastal Resources Management Council, is also
considering a permit application and opened its comment period on
November 15, 2012.26 In addition, Deepwater’s Environmental Report
lists eleven other federal permits, seven other state permits, and three more
local permits that are anticipated to be approved by the end of 2013.27
Deepwater is also facing a new complaint filed by a Newport resident
with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”). FERC
recently issued a “notice of intent not to act” on the complaint, which will
allow the petitioner to file a complaint in federal court.28
Now that the basic history of the Block Island Wind Farm has been
recounted, the following section will explore in considerably more detail
the underlying legal issues, focusing primarily on energy and
environmental concerns.
III. LEGAL ISSUES AND ANALYSIS
The myriad legal issues involved in the development and approval of
the Block Island Wind Farm are best divided into three categories: (1)
energy regulations, (2) environmental regulations, and (3) land use
regulations. This section will explore Deepwater’s ongoing journey
through these various legal and regulatory hurdles, while simultaneously
analyzing competing arguments and counterarguments.
A. Energy Regulation
Deepwater Wind is fundamentally an energy company, with the
ultimate goal of harnessing and selling wind energy for a profit. As such,
the construction and operation of the Block Island Wind Farm and the
http://block-island.villagesoup.com/news/story/Council-to-send-letter-for-Deepwater-loanguarantee/91542.
24
Judy Tierney, Deepwater Substation Approved, BLOCK ISLAND TIMES (Apr. 13, 2012),
http://block-island.villagesoup.com/news/story/deepwater-substation-approved/808215.
25
Press Release, U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, Public Comment Period Extended to Feb. 10 on
Deepwater Wind Proposal to Build Wind Turbines off Block Island Coast (Dec. 19, 2012), available at
http://www.nae.usace.army.mil/news/12/2012-127.pdf.
26
Pippa Jack, CRMC Opens Comment Period for Deepwater Wind, BLOCK ISLAND TIMES (Nov.
19, 2012), http://block-island.villagesoup.com/p/crmc-opens-comment-period-for-deepwaterwind/927367.
27
DEEPWATER WIND, ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT/CONSTRUCTION AND OPERATIONS PLAN 1-8 to
1-9 (2012), available at http://dwwind.com/docs/Environmental%20Report.pdf.
28
Riggs v. R.I. Pub. Utilities Comm’n, 141 FERC ¶ 61033 (2012).
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Deepwater Wind Energy Center are governed by myriad energy laws and
regulations. Deepwater’s greatest legal challenge has come at the state
level of energy regulation, where two pieces of new legislation were
needed to force the Block Island Wind Farm into Rhode Island’s
regulatory scheme.29
At the federal level, the Federal Power Act only authorizes the federal
government to regulate the sale of electricity in interstate commerce.30
Since only electricity rates within Rhode Island will increase as a result of
the PPA between Deepwater Wind and National Grid, FERC is unlikely to
assert jurisdiction. Federal tax credits for wind energy, however, will
substantially increase the project’s ultimate profitability.
This section details Deepwater’s state-sponsored journey through the
legal, legislative, and judicial system of Rhode Island. It then explains the
absence of FERC jurisdiction and examines the impact of federal tax
credits.
1. Rhode Island Renewable Energy Law
Rhode Island’s energy statutes are codified in Title 39 of its General
Laws, labeled “Public Utilities and Carriers.”31 The section begins by
declaring that the electricity distribution business is “affected with a public
interest.”32 The statute then delegates the supervision and regulation of
intrastate energy services to the PUC,33 a “quasi-judicial tribunal”34 tasked
with implementing and enforcing Rhode Island energy law. The PUC also
provides an administrative forum for aggrieved parties seeking judicial
review of its actions and decisions.35 The Commission is composed of
three electors selected based on experience in law, government, energy
matters, and other relevant fields.36 The Commissioners are appointed by
the governor (pending approval by the state senate) and serve six-year
terms.37
Historically, Rhode Island’s energy policy was focused on protecting
consumers by “promot[ing] availability of adequate, efficient and
economical energy . . . [with] just and reasonable rates.”38 The PUC was
29
See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 39-26.1-3(a) (Supp. 2012) (requiring electric distribution companies to
contract with renewable energy developers); id. § 39-26.1-7(a) (specifically authorizing Deepwater’s
PPA and delineating specific facets of the Block Island Wind Farm as requiring approval by the PUC);
id. § 39-26.1-7(c)(iv) (broadening the definition of “commercially reasonable”).
30
16 U.S.C. § 824(a) (2006).
31
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 39 (2006).
32
Id. § 39-1-1(a)(1).
33
Id. § 39-1-1(c).
34
Id. § 39-1-3(a).
35
Id. § 39-1-1(c).
36
Id. § 39-1-4(a).
37
Id.
38
Id. § 39-1-1(b).
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specifically charged with “protecting . . . the public against improper and
unreasonable rates, tolls and charges.”39 As recently as 2006, Rhode Island
legislatively declared that “the state’s economy and the health and general
welfare of the people of Rhode Island benefit when energy supplies are
reliable and least-cost.”40
But this pure economic calculus has recently been subverted by Rhode
Island’s new focus on renewable energy development. In 2004, Rhode
Island codified new legislative findings encouraging the development of
renewable energy sources.41 Beginning in 2007, electricity distributors
were statutorily required to obtain an annually increasing percentage of
their energy from renewable energy resources,42 including wind.43 The
PUC was thus faced with the challenge of promulgating new renewable
energy standards within a regulatory scheme originally devised to lower
consumer costs.
Predictably, difficulties arose when renewable energy proved to be far
more expensive than the natural gas on which Rhode Island has almost
exclusively depended.44 When state officials first decided to partner with
Deepwater to build a wind farm, Andrew Dzykewicz, Governor Carcieri’s
chief energy adviser and leader of the negotiations,45 stated that Deepwater
would sell electricity at between seven and nine cents per kilowatt-hour
(kWh).46 But when it came time to negotiate the first PPA, National Grid
calculated the cost of Deepwater’s wind energy at 30.7 cents/kWh, more
than three times the 9.2 cents/kWh it was paying for electricity from other
sources.47 The final agreed-upon amount was 24.4 cents/kWh, with an
escalator clause that would increase this price by 3.5% annually over the
twenty-year contract.48 This would culminate in a final price of 46.9
cents/kWh, with an average price of 34.5 cents/kWh over the lifetime of
the PPA.
39

Id. § 39-1-1(c).
Id. § 39-1-1(e)(3).
41
Id. § 39-26-1.
42
Id. § 39-26-4; see id. § 39-26-2(16) (Supp. 2012) (defining “obligated entity” to include electric
utility distribution companies).
43
Id. § 39-26-5(a)(2) (Supp 2012).
44
In 2009, 97% of Rhode Island’s electric power generation came from natural gas. Fuel Sources
for Electric Power Generation in My State: Rhode Island in 2009, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY (Nov. 9,
2012), http://apps1.eere.energy.gov/states/electricity_generation.cfm/state=RI.
45
Ted Nesi, Carcieri Energy Adviser Dzykewicz Resigns, PROVIDENCE BUS. NEWS (July 21,
2009), http://www.pbn.com/Carcieri-energy-adviser-Dzykewicz-resigns,43686.
46
Barmann, N.J. Firm Picked, supra note 7. Mr. Dzykewicz also erroneously predicted that the
project would not require the passage of any new legislation. Id. He resigned from his position in
August 2009 to pursue other opportunities. Nesi, supra note 45.
47
Alex Kuffner, National Grid Says Price of Wind Power Is Too High, PROVIDENCE J., Oct. 17,
2009, at 1.
48
In re Proposed Town of New Shoreham Project, 25 A.3d 482, 491–92 (R.I. 2011).
40
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This PPA was rejected by the PUC on March 30, 2010. The PUC
applied the then-existing statutory definition of “commercially reasonable”
and concluded that the PPA did not meet this standard.50 The Commission
used a two-prong analysis in which it (1) compared the pricing of the PPA
with other renewable energy projects, and (2) compared Deepwater’s
expected internal rate of return (“IRR”) “with what an experienced power
analyst would expect from other renewable energy projects.”51 The
Commission found that the PPA failed both of these tests.52
The first prong of the analysis required the PUC to determine the range
of projects to consider in evaluating the reasonableness of the PPA pricing
structure.53 In doing so, the Commission refused to adopt the “self
referent” interpretation of “commercially reasonable” advocated by
Deepwater, which would require an exceedingly narrow (and obviously
useless) comparison between the Block Island Wind Farm and projects that
were identical “in nearly every facet, from . . . size, . . . location and even
the benefits [rendered] to Block Island.”54 Instead, the Commission
decided that the prices in the PPA should be compared to the cost of both
other proposed and existing offshore wind farms and the cost of other
statutorily defined renewable energy sources.55 In making this comparison,
the PUC found “that Deepwater’s pricing was clearly higher than any
technology except [photovoltaic] solar.”56
In the second prong of the analysis, the Commission evaluated the rate
of return expected to accrue to Deepwater and its investors.57 In examining
this issue, the Commission ruled that “the IRR should be sufficient to
attract investors, but not more than is necessary to secure financing.”58 In
other words, ratepayers should be subsidizing the project only enough for it
to be feasible, without providing too generous a profit margin for a
company that was already enjoying a legally guaranteed market for its
electricity. The Commission decided to rely on the testimony of an
“independent power market analyst” who had “no financial stake in the
outcome of the matter,” rather than Deepwater’s own financial
projections.59 Based on this testimony, the PUC found that “the IRR and
resulting pricing is above that which an experienced power market analyst
49

Id. at 492–93.
Town of New Shoreham Project, 280 P.U.R.4th 185, 185 (R.I.P.U.C. Apr. 2, 2010), order
corrected 2010 WL 2719959 (R.I.P.U.C. Apr. 5, 2010).
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
See id. at 213.
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
Id. at 185.
58
Id. at 214.
59
Id.
50
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would expect to see in transactions involving newly developed renewable
energy resources.”60
In reaction to the rejection of the PPA, Governor Carcieri called the
decision “extraordinarily shortsighted and narrow-minded,” and vowed to
enlist state legislators in getting the Block Island Wind Farm back on
track.61 Less than two months after the PUC’s initial rejection of the PPA,
the Rhode Island General Assembly passed new legislation overtly
supporting the Wind Farm62 and providing strict new instructions for the
Commission to follow in reviewing a revised PPA.63
The new legislation explicitly authorized Deepwater Wind and
National Grid to enter into a PPA on terms consistent with the previously
rejected contract.64 The new statute also micromanaged the PUC review
process so as to effectively strip the Commission of any real discretion in
reconsidering the PPA. First, a new expert witness, paid for by Deepwater
and hired by the Rhode Island Economic Development Corporation, was to
testify regarding the terms and conditions of the contract.65 Next, the
statute redefined “commercially reasonable” to “mean terms and pricing
that are reasonably consistent with what an experienced power market
analyst would expect to see for a project of a similar size, technology and
location, and meeting the policy goals in subsection (a).”66 Compared to
the old definition, which only directed comparison to “transactions
involving newly developed renewable resources,”67 this new definition not
only restricted the comparison criteria, it added policy considerations that
included the ultra-specific local goal of connecting Block Island to the
mainland power grid.68 Finally, the statute delineated new factors that
60

Id. at 215.
Alex Kuffner, Proposed Wind Farm off Block Island Remains Stalled, PROVIDENCE J., Apr. 9,
2010, at 3.
62
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 39-26.1-7(a) (2012) (“The general assembly finds it is in the public interest
for the state to facilitate the construction of a small-scale offshore wind demonstration project off the
coast of Block Island, including an undersea transmission cable that interconnects Block Island to the
mainland . . . .”).
63
In re Review of Proposed Town of New Shoreham Project, 25 A.3d 482, 495–97 (R.I. 2011).
64
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 39-26.1-7(a) (2012).
65
Id. § 39-26.1-7(b).
66
Id. § 39-26.1-7(c)(iv). The listed policy goals were to:
61

position the state to take advantage of the economic development benefits of the
emerging offshore wind industry; promote the development of renewable energy
sources that increase the nation’s energy independence from foreign sources of
fossil fuels; reduce the adverse environmental and health impacts of traditional fossil
fuel energy sources; and provide the Town of New Shoreham with an electrical
connection to the mainland.
Id. § 39-26.1-7(a).
67
Town of New Shoreham Project, 280 P.U.R.4th 185, 185 (R.I.P.U.C. Apr. 2, 2010), order
corrected 2010 WL 2719959 (R.I.P.U.C. Apr. 5, 2010).
68
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 39-26.1-7(c)(iv).
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would require approval of the PPA, including if it was “likely to . . . further
development of Quonset Business Park [where Deepwater planned to build
parts of the turbines],”69 and if “[t]he amended power purchase agreement
is likely to provide environmental benefits, including the reduction of
carbon emissions.”70
The second time around, adjudicating under the new legislation, the
PUC approved the PPA.71 But even under the seemingly inflexible new
standards, the PUC was divided. In addition to the controlling approval
“by the Commission,”72 the three Commissioners each authored a separate
opinion, with two concurrences73 and one dissent.74
The majority opinion, respecting the explicit and specific intent of the
new legislation, resolved to interpret ambiguities and weigh the evidence
so as to effectuate the development of the wind farm.75 By applying the
narrow new statutory definition of “commercially reasonable,” the
Commission decided that the projected IRR analysis was within the zone
of reasonableness.76
The majority diverged in their analyses regarding economic benefits,
and filed concurring opinions on this issue.77 Chairman Germani and
Commissioner Roberti disagreed over whether the applicable statutes
required a net economic benefits test, but noted that their methodologies
arrived at the same result.78
Commissioner Bray, however, authored a vigorous dissent, arguing
that the PPA was still not commercially reasonable, did not include a
proper price reduction provision, and would not provide economic
development benefits.79 She rejected the majority’s deference to legislative
intent, and instead “weighed the evidence and interpreted the law . . . as I
would in any other case.”80 Commissioner Bray found “absurd” the
argument that the PUC was statutorily required to look only at the
economic benefits of the project and not the potential for economic harm.81
She also took issue with the cost of the wind farm as projected by

69

Id. § 39-26.1-7(c)(iii).
Id. § 39-26.1-7(c)(iv).
71
Review of Amended Power Purchase Agreement Between Narragansett Elec. Co. & Deepwater
Wind Block Island, No. 4185, 2010 WL 3458306, at *1 (R.I.P.U.C. Aug. 16, 2010).
72
Id.
73
Id. at *68 (Germani, Comm’r, concurring); id. at *69 (Roberti, Comm’r, concurring).
74
Id. at *70 (Bray, Comm’r, dissenting).
75
Id. at *63.
76
Id. at *64.
77
Id. at *68 (Germani, Comm’r, concurring); id. at *69 (Roberti, Comm’r, concurring).
78
Id. at *68–69.
79
Id. at *70 (Bray, Comm’r, dissenting).
80
Id.
81
Id. at *71 (Bray, Comm’r, dissenting).
70
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Deepwater for the purposes of the cost-savings provision, arguing that
Deepwater undervalued the figure in order to retain profits if savings were
achieved in the actual cost of the project.83 Finally, Commissioner Bray
attempted to turn the narrow definition of “commercially reasonable”
against Deepwater by challenging the sufficiency of the evidence
presented, opining that “the proponents of the Amended PPA failed to
meet their burden of proof as to commercial reasonableness on terms and
pricing.”84
Three remarkably different interested parties attempted to challenge
the PUC’s approval of the amended PPA by filing petitions for certiorari
with the Supreme Court of Rhode Island.85 Toray and Polytop, two Rhode
Island plastics manufacturers, continued their fight against electricity hikes
that would result from the PPA.86 Attorney General Patrick Lynch, a vocal
opponent against the project,87 also filed a petition, though it was later
withdrawn by his successor, Peter Kilmartin.88 The final petitioner for
certiorari was the Conservation Law Foundation (“CLF”), which, though
in favor of “renewable energy done right,” took the position that the
amended law created “an unlevel playing field that would make it
impossible for developers to compete successfully for future projects.”89
The Supreme Court of Rhode Island allowed Governor Carcieri to
intervene on behalf of Deepwater Wind, along with the Rhode Island
Senate President and the Speaker of the House.90 The court denied
standing to CLF to continue their appeal, declining to permit the
Foundation to remain in the case based on a theory of “substantial public
interest,” and leaving Toray and Polytop as the proverbial “last man

82

R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 39-26.1-7(e)(i)–(ii).
Review of Amended Power Purchase Agreement Between Narragansett Elec. Co. & Deepwater
Wind Block Island, 2010 WL 3458306 at *74 (Bray, Comm’r, dissenting).
84
Id. at *75 (Bray, Comm’r, dissenting).
85
Review of Proposed Town of New Shoreham Project, 25 A.3d 482, 503 (R.I. 2011).
86
See Review of Amended Power Purchase Agreement Between Narragansett Elec. Co. &
Deepwater Wind Block Island, 2010 WL 3458306, at *5 (identifying Toray as a manufacturer using
160 million kWh per year and facing an expected rate increase of $287,000, and Polytop as a
manufacturer using 17 million kWh per year and facing an expected rate increase of $42,000).
87
In his last official act as attorney general, Patrick Lynch sent out a letter to local nonprofit
organizations to rally opposition to the wind farm, “calling it an inside deal pushed by . . . Governor
Carcieri” that would “force . . . families and businesses . . . to buy grossly overpriced electricity for the
next 20 years to specifically guarantee one company’s revenues and profits.” Tracy Breton, Outgoing
Lynch Urges Groups to Fight Wind Farm Project, PROVIDENCE J., Jan. 4, 2011, at 5.
88
Alex Kuffner, Kilmartin Drops Appeal over Proposed Offshore Wind Farm, PROVIDENCE J.,
Feb. 5, 2011, at 3.
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CLF Statement on PUC Ruling on Deepwater Wind/National Grid Power Purchase Agreement,
CONSERVATION LAW FOUND. (Aug. 11, 2010), http://www.clf.org/newsroom/clf-statement-on-pucruling-on-deepwater-windnational-grid-power-purchase-agreement/.
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91

standing” in the litigation. As petitioners seeking to overturn the PUC
decision, the manufacturers bore a difficult burden before the Rhode Island
Supreme Court, which had to defer to the Commission’s discretion unless
it “exceeded its authority or acted illegally, arbitrarily, or unreasonably.”92
Toray and Polytop first contended that the Commission was overly
deferential in approving the PPA, and thus essentially “rubber stamp[ed]”
the contract by abdicating their proper reviewing authority.93 Unconvinced
by this argument, the court held that the PUC did not err in varying their
normal standard of review according to the amended legislation.94
The petitioner’s “most strident objection” centered on the transmission
cable that would connect Block Island with the mainland power grid.95
They argued that the intent of the amended legislation mandated that the
PPA require construction and maintenance of the transmission cable,
which the 2010 version did not, even though the (rejected) 2009 version
did contain this affirmative obligation.96 Subsequently, petitioners argued
that this particular modification of the contract was illegal under the
statute, and that the 2010 PPA was not “commercially reasonable” since it
failed to incorporate costs for the cable.97
The Supreme Court of Rhode Island disagreed, holding that the
amended legislation did not require the PPA to provide for a transmission
cable,98 and thereby defeating the central premise of the petitioner’s cablebased argument. The court was also unpersuaded by the petitioner’s
arguments concerning the statute’s policy goal of stabilizing long-term
energy prices,99 providing economic development benefits,100 and
providing environmental benefits.101
The court concluded with a rhetorical flourish, by first expressing
some “trepidation” about “the General Assembly’s unwavering quest to
sink this demonstration wind farm into the sediment of Rhode Island’s
91

Id.
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 39-5-3 (2006).
93
In re Review of Proposed Town of New Shoreham Project, 25 A.3d at 507. This argument
closely echoed a main point of contention in Commissioner Bray’s dissent. Id.
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Id. at 508.
95
Id. at 508−09.
96
Id. at 509.
97
Id.
98
Id.
99
See id. at 514−15 (“[I]t was not necessary for the commission, or the 2010 PPA, to speak
directly to this [general policy goal].”).
100
See id. at 526 (“[B]ecause the commission was not required to use a net-benefit test and
because the commission properly afforded substantial deference to the EDC advisory opinion, which
assessed economic benefits of $129 million, we agree that the commission did not err in finding that
the 2010 PPA met the requirements of § 39–26.1–7(c)(iii).”).
101
See id. at 526 (“The approval of the 2010 PPA creates the likelihood that the environmental
benefits that DEM attributed to the cable will be fulfilled. As such, the commission did not err . . . .”).
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102

continental shelf.”
In affirming the PUC’s decision, the court reiterated
its deferential standard of review and the specificity of the revised
statute.103 Finally, it expressed “fervent hope” that the Legislature’s
“William Seward-esque policy decision . . . proves as lucrative and
majestic as the Alaska Purchase of 1867.”104
Toray Plastics mounted one last challenge by filing an objection to the
mutual waiver to a termination clause in the contract between Deepwater
and National Grid that had been sent to the Commission on September 29,
2011.105 According to Toray’s interpretation, the clause meant that if the
amended PPA had not received Commission approval (including the
resolution of any appeals) by June 30, 2011, then the PPA would
automatically terminate unless the parties had previously agreed to
mutually waive this term of the agreement.106 Since the Supreme Court of
Rhode Island had handed down its decision one day later, on July 1, Toray
argued that the PPA was not actually in effect, and therefore the parties’
ability to waive the termination clause had expired.107 Moreover, because
the PUC had completed its task in reviewing the PPA, it no longer had any
authority to approve a waiver of the termination clause.108
The Commission predictably disagreed, asserting that it had continuing
jurisdiction over the PPA in order to aid the legislative purpose of
establishing the Block Island Wind Farm.109 The Commission then
approved the waiver of the termination clause, finding “no public policy
reason to interfere” with the intention of Deepwater and National Grid to
continue operating under the amended agreement.110
2. Federal Wind Energy Law
Like Rhode Island at the state level, the federal government has
provided significant support to the development of wind energy in the
United States. The most important support comes in the form of tax
credits.
a. Federal Legislation and Tax Credits for Wind Energy
The Wind Energy Systems Act of 1980111 marked the beginning of
102

Id.
Id. at 526−27.
104
Id. at 527.
105
Narragansett Electric Co. & Deepwater Wind Block Island, 2012 WL 423628, at *1
(R.I.P.U.C. Jan. 24, 2012).
106
Id.
107
Id. at *1–2.
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Id. at *2.
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Id. at *9.
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Id. at *10.
111
Wind Energy Systems Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-345, 94 Stat. 1139 (1980).
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earnest federal support for wind energy.
In passing the Act, Congress
asserted that “it is the proper and appropriate role of the Federal
Government to undertake research and development, to participate in
demonstration programs for wind energy systems, and to assist private
industry, other entities, and the general public in hastening the widespread
utilization of such systems.”113 The Act authorized the Secretary of Energy
to encourage the development of wind energy technology through grants,
loans, and other forms of financial assistance.114
The Block Island Wind Farm is a privately funded venture backed by
New York hedge fund D.E. Shaw & Co.115 Though Deepwater Wind has
not received grants and loans under the Wind Energy Systems Act, it is set
to receive sizable federal tax credits. The Energy Policy Act of 1992116
first introduced a renewable electricity production credit,117 which was
extended through 2012 by the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act
of 2009,118 and most recently extended for one more year as part of the
“fiscal cliff” budget deal passed on January 1, 2013.119 Under the tax
scheme, Deepwater would choose between taking a Production Tax Credit
of 2.2 cents/kWh produced,120 or an up-front Investment Tax Credit
(“ITC”) equal to thirty percent of the Block Island Wind Farm’s
CEO Jeff Grybowski indicated that
development expenditures.121
Deepwater would choose the ITC in order to secure up-front financing for
the project.122
b. Federal Energy Regulation: No Concurrent Jurisdiction
Energy regulation is handled either at the state or federal level, but not
112
4 MARY SCARBROUGH & REUVEN HOCH, WEST’S FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE
§ 4650 (3d ed. 1996 & Supp. 2012).
113
42 U.S.C. § 9201(a)(8) (2006).
114
Id. § 9205(c).
115
Ted Nesi, Deepwater Wind’s Key Backer Hits Skids, WPRI.COM (Sept. 29, 2010, 4:13 PM),
http://www.wpri.com/dpp/money/business_news/deepwater-winds-key-backer-hits-skids.
116
Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, 106 Stat. 2776 (1992).
117
SCARBROUGH & HOCH, supra note 112.
118
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 1101, 123 Stat 115,
319 (2009); Christopher Riti, Comment, Three Sheets to the Wind: The Renewable Energy Production
Tax Credit, Congressional Political Posturing, and an Unsustainable Energy Policy, 27 PACE ENVTL.
L. REV. 783, 805 (2010).
119
Stephanie Turaj, Wind Tax Credits Extended, BLOCK ISLAND TIMES (Jan. 11, 2013),
http://block-island.villagesoup.com/p/wind-tax-credits-extended/945113.
120
The renewable energy production credit is 1.5 cents per kWh, adjusted for inflation and
rounded to the nearest multiple of 0.1 cent. 26 U.S.C. §§ 45(a)–(b) (2006). In 2012, the IRS listed the
credit as 2.2 cents per kWh. I.R.S. Notice 2012-35, 2012 I.R.B. 937, 940 (May 21, 2012).
121
See Mitchell Ward, The PTC and Wind Energy: Restructuring the Production Tax Credit as a
More Effective Incentive, 11 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 455, 473 (2011) (“A taxpayer may now
irrevocably elect to take an Investment Tax Credit (ITC) in lieu of the [Production Tax Credit] for wind
facilities . . . limited to thirty percent of the property’s basis . . . .”).
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Turaj, supra note 119.
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concurrently.
The Federal Power Act authorizes the FERC to regulate
the sale of electricity in interstate commerce, leaving jurisdiction over
intrastate matters to individual states.124
The PUC assumed jurisdiction for regulating the PPA between
Deepwater and National Grid, and this jurisdiction was not challenged
during the proceedings that culminated in the 2011 Supreme Court of
Rhode Island decision.125 One party, however, has filed a federal
complaint attempting to argue for federal jurisdiction over the PPA.
Benjamin Riggs, a longtime opponent of the project, filed a complaint with
FERC arguing in part that the Block Island Wind Farm’s “electricity will
be fed into the New England grid and presumably be sold in interstate
commerce.”126 The complaint then argues that under applicable federal
law, the rates charged in the PPA are not “just and reasonable.”127
Riggs’s jurisdictional presumption is likely based on the fact that
National Grid distributes electricity outside of Rhode Island, specifically to
New York and Massachusetts.128 But two factors make it highly unlikely
that power from the Block Island Wind Farm will actually be transmitted
out of Rhode Island. First, the demonstration-scale project will produce
only a small fraction of Rhode Island’s energy needs; there is certainly no
need to transmit excess power to neighboring states. Second, Rhode Island
took some of the sting out of requiring National Grid to buy above-market
renewable energy by authorizing “financial remuneration and incentives”
that allow the electricity purchased from Deepwater to be marked up by
2.75%.129 This state-legislated utility increase is paid by Rhode Island
ratepayers, and there would be no way for National Grid to collect this
remuneration from out-of-state electricity consumers.
Regardless of where the electricity actually flows, it is highly unlikely
that FERC would attempt to assert federal jurisdiction after three years of
state litigation. FERC recently issued a “notice of intent not to act” on
While this notice contains no reasoning for the
Riggs’s petition.130
inaction, it can be inferred that FERC thought that the federal energy
123
See 16 U.S.C. § 824(a) (“Federal [electric energy] regulation . . . extend[s] only to those
matters which are not subject to regulation by the States.”).
124
16 U.S.C. § 791a, 824(a) (2006).
125
See In re Proposed Town of New Shoreham Project, 25 A.3d 482, 486–503 (R.I. 2011)
(recapping the case’s procedural and factual background, with no mention of a jurisdictional
challenge).
126
Complaint at 3, Riggs v. R.I. Pub. Util. Comm’n, No. EL 12-100 (F.E.R.C. Aug. 22, 2012).
127
Id.; see also 16 U.S.C. § 824d(a) (2006) (requiring that all rates and charges be “just and
reasonable”).
128
NATIONAL GRID, https://www1.nationalgridus.com/CorporateHub (last visited Feb. 7, 2013).
129
See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 39-26.1-4 (Supp. 2012); Alex Kuffner, Utility to Buy Wind Farm’s
Electricity, PROVIDENCE J., Dec. 10, 2009, at 1 (“[A] 2.75-percent markup on electricity generated
from renewable sources . . . is allowed by state law.”).
130
Riggs, 141 FERC ¶ 61033 (Oct. 18, 2012).
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claims were jurisdictionally baseless and not worth adjudicating.
The FERC notice does allow Mr. Riggs to bring an action in federal
court,131 which would be a more sensible place to address his separate
argument that Rhode Island has violated the dormant Commerce Clause by
statutorily favoring one in-state renewable energy source.132 This part of
Riggs’s original FERC complaint incorporates arguments made by
TransCanada (a rival renewable energy developer) on the application of the
Commerce Clause in the First Circuit.133
The TransCanada/Benjamin Riggs dormant Commerce Clause
arguments are theoretically sound but attenuated by the multistep
application of the allegedly unconstitutional statute, and by the
overstretching of prior judicial holdings to accommodate this application.
The practical application of the modified Long-Term Contracting Standard
for Renewable Energy134 is unquestionably to facilitate the development
and commercial success of one particular wind energy project by one
particular in-state company. That application, however, depends on the
interaction of the renewable energy standard that requires electricity
distributors to purchase a certain percentage of energy from renewable
sources, and the separate legislation giving explicit direction to the PUC in
approving the PPA between Deepwater and National Grid.135 More
specifically, Section 39-26.1-7 requires National Grid to buy power from
Deepwater that counts “as part of the minimum long-term contract
capacity,”136 allegedly to the detriment of out-of-state renewable energy
producers seeking their own slice of that required percentage.137
This argument is flawed because even though the law creates a
statutorily-required renewable energy market and then helps one Rhode
Island company within that market, out-of-state renewable energy
companies are still not necessarily excluded from selling electricity in
Rhode Island. Therefore, the law falls short of paralleling Wyoming v.
Oklahoma,138 in which the Supreme Court struck down an Oklahoma law
requiring its coal-fired power plants to purchase at least 10% of their coal
from local sources.139 Moreover, even if the law were found to be
discriminatory, the policy goal of connecting Block Island to the mainland
131

Id.
Complaint at 4, Riggs v. R.I. Pub. Util. Comm’n, No. EL 12-100 (F.E.R.C. Aug. 22, 2012).
133
See id. at 2, 4 (describing TransCanada’s Commerce Clause argument).
134
R.I. GEN LAWS § 39-26.1 (Supp. 2012).
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See supra Part III.A.1.
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R.I. GEN LAWS § 39-26.1-7(h) (Supp. 2012).
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See Motion to Dismiss for TransCanada at 4, Riggs v. R.I. Pub. Util. Comm’n, No. EL 12-100
(F.E.R.C. Aug. 22, 2012) (“Thus the Subsection 7 PPA (if it is approved) will reduce the volume that
may be won by any other generators seeking to compete for long-term contracts pursuant to the LTC
Statute.”).
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502 U.S. 437 (1992).
139
Id. at 455, 461.
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power grid could potentially qualify as a “legitimate local purpose”
without practical “non-discriminatory alternatives” sufficient to satisfy
constitutionality.140 The cost of the undersea transmission cable is
prohibitive without the incentive of the Wind Farm, the Wind Farm cannot
be financed without the PPA, and the PPA would not have been approved
without the revised legislation.
Of course, the federal lawsuit has not even been filed yet, so it is
somewhat premature to evaluate the strength of the case before a complaint
is available for review. Still, it appears that Mr. Riggs faces an uphill
battle in continuing to pursue these constitutional arguments.
B. Environmental Regulations
Although the Block Island Wind Farm is intrinsically a clean energy
project predicted to have positive environmental effects,141 it is still subject
to myriad federal and state environmental regulations and permitting
procedures. At the state level, Deepwater Wind has benefited from official
state sponsorship in navigating the regulatory process.142 Therefore,
significant resistance from state environmental agencies is unlikely. At the
federal level, however, government agencies making decisions affecting
the project must follow specific permitting processes under the
Administrative Procedure Act, which requires public notice of proposed
rulemaking followed by opportunities for public comment and
participation.143
1. Rhode Island Environmental Law
Two state agencies have significant regulatory authority over the Block
Island Wind Farm: the Coastal Resources Management Council
(“CRMC”), and the Department of Environmental Management (“DEM”).
The CRMC issues work permits within Rhode Island’s coastal zone,144
which Deepwater will need in order to construct a wind farm and
transmission cable within state waters. The DEM is primarily concerned
with the local environmental effects of the project, including water

140

Family Winemakers of Cal. v. Jenkins, 592 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2010).
The RIPUC unanimously concluded that, at the very least, carbon emissions would be reduced
by eliminating Block Island’s reliance on diesel generators except as a backup in case of a cable
outage. In re Proposed Town of New Shoreham Project, 25 A.3d 482, 526 (R.I. 2011).
142
See Chris Barrett, Deepwater Moves Ahead with Wind Farm, BLOCK ISLAND TIMES (Jan. 26,
2009), http://block-island.villagesoup.com/news/story/Deepwater-moves-ahead-with-wind-farm-Fiveto-eight-turbines-would-power-the-entire-island/88890 (“The state . . . will help steer Deepwater
through a host of state and federal approval processes.”).
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5 U.S.C. §§ 553(b)–(c) (2006).
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pollution and threats to endangered species.

a. Coastal Resources Management Council
The CRMC issues work permits for any work done “in, above, or
beneath” Rhode Island state waters.146 Though Deepwater’s application is
still pending,147 CRMC assent is all but guaranteed, given that the original
Joint Development Agreement (“JDA”) between Deepwater and the state
requires the state to “use all reasonable efforts within its lawful
authority . . . to cause CRMC to grant to DWW [Deepwater Wind] upon
DWW acquiring all necessary permits and approvals . . . and at
commercially reasonable terms the right to use the submerged lands.”148
Under the JDA, CRMC is even required to assist and advocate for the
project with other agencies: “The CRMC shall make all reasonable efforts
to expedite the SAMP [Special Area Management Plan] and to obtain all
associated necessary federal, state, and local government permits and
approvals. The State shall advocate on behalf of the Project, where
appropriate, with Federal Agencies and State Agencies.”149 Assuming the
CRMC adheres to this contractual language, it would seem that it has no
real choice in whether to permit the Block Island Wind Farm. After
CRMC assents, negotiations can begin for a submerged lands lease at
“commercially reasonable” terms.150
Despite the contractual predisposition towards approval, CRMC will
still need to carefully examine the project in accordance with its statutory
permitting requirements. Under Rhode Island law, Deepwater has the
burden of demonstrating that project will not: “(i) [s]ignificantly adversely
affect any shellfish management area as designated by the department of
environmental management or the marine fisheries council; (ii) [b]e in a
significant conflict with the marine ecology within or adjacent to the
state’s territorial waters; or (iii) [s]ignificantly harm or destroy existing
fishing grounds.”151 Deepwater’s application undoubtedly satisfies the first
two criteria; the Wind Farm is even located in a designated “Renewable
Energy Zone” that has been pre-established by the CRMC and specifically
145
See DEEPWATER WIND, ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT/CONSTRUCTION AND OPERATIONS PLAN 19 (2012), http://dwwind.com/docs/Environmental%20Report.pdf (listing Rhode Island Pollution
Discharge Elimination System General Permit for Storm Water Discharge and a consultation under the
Rhode Island Endangered Species Act as required DEM approvals for the Block Island Wind Farm).
146
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 46-23-6(4)(i) (2007).
147
Deepwater anticipates CRMC approval in the second quarter of 2013. DEEPWATER WIND,
supra note 145, at 8 tbl.1.3-1.
148
JOINT DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE STATE OF RHODE ISLAND AND DEEPWATER
WIND, RHODE ISLAND, LLC 9 (2009), available at http://www.cfcri.com/Joint_Development_Agreeme
nt_1-2-2009_1.pdf.
149
Id.
150
Id.; DEEPWATER WIND, supra note 145, at 1-9.
151
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 46-23-18.1(c) (2007).
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designed to minimize potential impact. In regards to fishing, Deepwater
admitted in its Environmental Report that construction of the project would
result in “moderate, short-term impacts,” but denied that the effects would
be “long-term or significant.”153 Additionally, the turbines have been sited
“to allow access both around and through the Project Area” in order to
minimize the detriment to marine uses such as fishing.154
b. Department of Environmental Management
The DEM is linked to the project in three ways: wetlands protection,
the protection of endangered species, and the issuance of permits for storm
water discharge. Bringing a cable ashore both on Block Island and in
Narragansett will impact wetlands, and therefore requires permits from the
DEM.155 DEM regulations require a permit for any “project or activity
which may alter any freshwater wetland.”156 In securing these permits,
Deepwater will be required to avoid and minimize impacts to freshwater
wetlands, taking into account a number of specifically listed issues.157
Deepwater has also consulted with the DEM about the impact on
wildlife; over fifty threatened and endangered species were identified as
potentially occurring within the project’s vicinity.158 Deepwater proposed
alternate cable routes and turbine layouts in order to mitigate the impact on
these species.159 Finally, the actual construction of the Wind Farm and the
laying of its accompanying cables will require Rhode Island Pollution
Discharge Elimination System General Permits for Storm Water Discharge
Associated with Construction Activity.160
As with the CRMC, project resistance from the DEM is highly
unlikely. In fact, the DEM issued an advisory opinion supporting the
project that was taken into consideration in evaluating the PPA.161 Given
152

DEEPWATER WIND, supra note 145, at ES-2.
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at tbl.1.3-1 (listing Coastal and Freshwater Wetlands Permit under state permits, approvals, and
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http://dwwind.com/docs/appendices/Appx-A%20Agency%20Correspondence.pdf.
159
Id.
160
DEEPWATER WIND, supra note 145, at 8 tbl.1.3-1.
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the DEM’s conclusion of “substantive environmental benefits” of the Wind
Farm,162 it would be inconsistent for them to raise serious objections during
the permitting process.
2. Applicable Federal Environmental Law
Although Deepwater Wind should have little trouble gaining necessary
approvals from the DEM and CRMC, the Block Island Wind Farm is also
subject to federal regulations administered by the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers (“USACE”) and the Department of Interior Bureau of Ocean
Energy Management.163 These agencies must follow specific protocol in
issuing the necessary permits, in accordance with both the Administrative
Procedure Act,164 and the National Environmental Policy Act.165
Additionally, the federal permitting agencies are required to comply with
the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”) and the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery
Conservation and Management Act (“Magnuson-Stevens”).166 Even with
the opportunity for public comment, Deepwater is unlikely to encounter
problems with applicable federal environmental law, given early indicators
and the relatively narrow jurisdiction of the federal agencies involved.
a. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
The USACE has jurisdiction over the Block Island Wind Farm under
§ 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act167 and § 404 of the Clean Water Act.168
The Rivers and Harbors Act gives the USACE jurisdiction over
obstructions in navigable waters,169 and the Clean Water Act gives them
jurisdiction over dredging and filling permits,170 which Deepwater will
need in order to place its turbines on the seabed and run underwater
transmission cables.
Deepwater has filed permit applications with the USACE, which
opened a comment period on October 2, 2012171 and later extended the
comment period through February 10, 2013.172 The USACE public notice
lists broad criteria for evaluating the project, calling for a cost-benefit
162
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5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006).
165
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analysis that includes all relevant factors, including conservation,
economics, aesthetics, environmental concerns, navigation, energy needs,
and the needs and welfare of the people.173 Though this would seem to
give the USACE almost unlimited discretion in deciding whether to
approve the project, it will in all likelihood only scrutinize the
environmental and navigational aspects of the Wind Farm, in accordance
with its original statutory jurisdiction.
In deciding whether to issue a permit, the USACE must evaluate
specific environmental effects of the project to ensure that it complies with
the ESA174 and Magnuson-Stevens.175 The District Engineer has made a
preliminary determination that neither the wind farm nor the transmission
cable is likely to adversely affect endangered species or have a substantial
adverse effect on fish and invertebrate species, though further consultation
with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and the National Marine Fisheries
Service will be conducted before the USACE issues its final decision.176
Regarding fish and invertebrate habitat degradation, the Public Notice
explained that Deepwater Wind minimized impacts by siting the turbines
and cables “to avoid direct impacts to important habitats such as eelgrass
and hard bottom substrates known to be used by some species.”177
USACE Project Manager Michael Elliott said at the outset of the
permitting process that he did not “see any big deal breakers.”178 In
addition, the USACE recently approved Cape Wind, another wind farm
project off the coast of Cape Cod.179 These indicators suggest that
Deepwater will not encounter significant opposition from the USACE.
b. Bureau of Ocean Energy Management
The Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (“BOEM”) is the federal
agency responsible for offshore renewable energy programs.180 In order to
run a transmission cable through federal waters, Deepwater Wind must

173

45 Day Public Notice, supra note 171, at 4.
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secure a Right-of-Way grant from BOEM.
As the first step in this
process, BOEM issued a “Notice of Determination of No Competitive
Interest,” meaning that no other parties are competing with Deepwater for
the ROW.182 Deepwater then submitted a General Activities Plan, which
awaits evaluation by the Bureau.183 BOEM will now cooperate with the
USACE in the NEPA process and with regard to the ESA and MagnusonStevens,184 obviating the need for a separate and redundant proceeding.
Future complications with the BOEM are unlikely for Deepwater, given
their limited mission of ensuring that renewable energy activities “are
conducted in a safe and environmentally sound manner.”185
C. Land Use Regulations
The foregoing sections discussed federal and state regulation of
Deepwater Wind’s use of the seabed for its wind farm and transmission
cables.186 But the Block Island Wind Farm will also require substantial
terrestrial construction, both on Block Island and in Narragansett, the
mainland town where the transmission cable is planned to go ashore. This
construction must be approved through local land use and zoning
processes.
Deepwater’s first inroads into local land use involved the
implementation of research equipment. The Southeast Light Foundation
rented space to Deepwater for a light detecting and ranging system to
monitor bird patterns, and the Town of New Shoreham rented space on a
communications tower for equipment to monitor bat activity.187 The local
Town Council also voted to allow the installation of a temporary
meteorological tower used to collect wind data.188 The substation that
would actually distribute electricity, however, required more exhaustive
review by multiple local land use authorities.
Rhode Island state law dictates that municipalities establish both a
planning board189 and a zoning board of review.190 The Town of New
181
See 30 C.F.R. § 585.300(a) (2012) (“An ROW grant authorizes the holder to install on the
OCS [Outer Continental Shelf] cables, pipelines, and associated facilities that involve the transportation
or transmission of electricity or other energy product from renewable energy projects.”).
182
Notice of Determination of No Competitive Interest, 77 Fed. Reg. 47,092, 47,092 (Aug. 7,
2012).
183
DEEPWATER WIND, supra note 145, at 8 tbl.1.3-1.
184
Notice of Determination of No Competitive Interest, 77 Fed. Reg. at 47,092.
185
30 C.F.R. § 585.101(c) (2012).
186
See supra Part III.B.
187
Chris Barrett, Deepwater Seeks Weather Tower Near North Light, BLOCK ISLAND TIMES (Feb.
17, 2009), http://block-island.villagesoup.com/news/story/Deepwater-seeks-weather-tower-near-NorthLight/88936.
188
Chris Barrett, Council Allows Deepwater MET Tower, BLOCK ISLAND TIMES (Mar. 9, 2009),
http://block-island.villagesoup.com/news/story/Council-allows-Deepwater-met-tower/88999.
189
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-22-1 (2009).
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Shoreham on Block Island has chartered both of these boards in
accordance with state law,191 along with a state-authorized historic district
commission.192 The Planning Board issues advisory opinions and
recommendations on zoning matters.193 The powers and duties of the
Zoning Board of Review include authorizing variances194 and special-use
permits,195 and referring matters to the Planning Board or Historic District
Commission.196
On Block Island, Deepwater Wind has already received approvals
from all three local land use boards/commissions for its substation to be
located on Block Island Power Company property. First, the Historic
District Commission issued a favorable advisory opinion, with the
condition that power lines be buried wherever possible,197 followed by a
Certificate of Appropriateness for construction.198
From the Zoning Board of Review, Deepwater needed both
construction approval and a variance for increased pole height for power
lines.199 In April 2012, the Zoning Board approved Deepwater’s
application for construction and conditionally allowed the variance.200
In addition to approval for the substation, Deepwater secured
easements from the Town Council for cables and manhole installations,
along with a work permit for the beach area where it plans to bring a cable
ashore.201 In exchange for the easements, Deepwater agreed to include
fiber optics with its cable connection to the mainland,202 along with a

190

Id. § 45-24-56.
NEW SHOREHAM, R.I., HOME RULE CHARTER art. IX, §§ 901, 903 (2010).
192
Historic district commissions are authorized, but not required. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-24.1-3(a)
(2009).
193
Id. § 45-22-7(c).
194
Id. § 45-24-57(1)(iv).
195
Id. § 45-24-57(1)(v).
196
Id. § 45-24-57(1)(vi).
197
Judy Tierney, HDC Approves Deepwater Siting and Massing Plan, BLOCK ISLAND TIMES
(Feb. 1, 2012), http://block-island.villagesoup.com/p/hdc-approves-deepwater-siting-and-massingplan/201327.
198
Dan West, Deepwater Gets First Approval with Long Permitting Road Ahead, BLOCK ISLAND
TIMES (Feb. 28, 2012), http://block-island.villagesoup.com/p/deepwater-gets-first-approval-with-longpermitting-road-ahead/219692.
199
Dan West, Deepwater Faces Tough Questioning by Zoning Board, BLOCK ISLAND TIMES
(Feb. 4, 2012), http://block-island.villagesoup.com/p/deepwater-faces-tough-questioning-by-zoningboard/203933.
200
The transmission poles were allowed only if a subsequent study found that underground lines
were not feasible. Judy Tierney, Zoning Approves Deepwater Substation, BLOCK ISLAND TIMES (Apr.
6, 2012), http://block-island.villagesoup.com/p/zoning-approves-deepwater-substation/804606.
201
Stephanie Turaj, Fiber Optics Now Part of Deepwater Cable, BLOCK ISLAND TIMES (June 24,
2012), http://block-island.villagesoup.com/p/fiber-optics-now-part-of-deepwater-cable/842165.
202
Id. The fiber optic connection is important to many islanders because the island currently
relies on slow and unreliable DSL for its Internet service. Id.
191
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203

reported payment of $350,000.
Finally, Deepwater will need approval from the Town of Narragansett
in order to bring its transmission cable ashore on the mainland side of the
Block Island Sound. The company was still negotiating with Narragansett
for an easement as of January 2013.204
IV. POLICY ANALYSIS
The most remarkable aspect of the Block Island Wind Farm’s legal
history is the fervor with which Governor Carcieri and the state legislature
created and altered Rhode Island law in order to accommodate the
project.205 Governor Carcieri has long been the project’s most vocal
champion, with rhetoric like “we have the opportunity to once again
control our economic destiny, to lead the nation in the creation of a new
industry, and to create hundreds, if not thousands, of good paying jobs for
Rhode Islanders.”206
On the other hand, vocal project opponent and former Rhode Island
Attorney General Patrick Lynch called the Wind Farm “an inside deal
pushed by . . . Governor Carcieri . . . [that would] force . . . families and
businesses . . . to buy grossly overpriced electricity for the next 20 years to
specifically guarantee one company’s revenues and profits.”207
It will likely take decades before the wisdom or foolishness of the
Block Island Wind Farm can fully be judged and analyzed. Whether it
turns out to be a catalyst for new clean energy development or a statesponsored bilking of Rhode Island electricity consumers depends on a
multitude of long-term economic and governmental factors that are
difficult to predict before the turbines have even started spinning. But it is
possible to at least examine the short-term implications of the project from
the perspective of different stakeholders. This section outlines and
analyzes the most immediate effects of the Block Island Wind Farm for
both Block Island residents and electricity ratepayers on the Rhode Island
mainland, before speculating on the long-term implications of the Wind
Farm as a demonstration project for the viability of offshore wind in the
203
Tamar Wilner, US Block Island Offshore Project Takes Step Forward, WIND POWER
MONTHLY (June 29, 2012, 3:17 PM), http://www.windpowermonthly.com/news/rss/1139388/USBlock-Island-offshore-project-takes-step-forward/.
204
Betty J. Cotter, Narragansett Wary of Deepwater’s Block Island Cable Connection Plan,
BLOCK ISLAND TIMES (Jan. 26, 2013), http://block-island.villagesoup.com/p/narragansett-wary-ofdeepwaters-block-island-cable-connection-plan/949407.
205
See supra Part III.A.1.
206
Governor Carcieri Commends Deepwater and National Grid for New Power Purchase
Agreement, DEEPWATER WIND (Jan. 31, 2013), http://dwwind.com/deepwater-news/governor-carciericommends-deepwater-and-national-grid-for-new-power-purchase-agreement.
207
Tracy Breton, Outgoing Lynch Urges Groups to Fight Wind-Farm Project, PROVIDENCE J.,
Jan. 4, 2011, at 5.
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United States. It concludes by reflecting on the complex regulatory
frameworks entailed in the permitting process, and whether and how this
system could be improved for future renewable energy projects.
A. Block Island Residents
Depending on personal priorities, Block Island residents and
homeowners have both the most to gain from the Wind Farm and the most
to lose. The primary benefit to Islanders is the anticipated reduction in
electricity costs by being connected to the mainland power grid. But
people on Block Island also stand to incur significant aesthetic harm in the
obstruction of ocean vistas by spinning wind turbines. Balancing these
factors can be a largely subjective exercise, primarily due to the inherent
difficulty in quantifying aesthetic harms. Nonetheless, the logical place to
start is with anticipated electricity savings in order to quantify the primary
economic benefit.
Block Island is currently powered by diesel generators supplied by
truckloads of diesel fuel delivered by ferry.208 As a result, Islanders pay
some of the highest electricity rates in the nation,209 up to four times more
expensive than those on the mainland.210 Moreover, island electricity rates
can be volatile, since they are directly tied to the fluctuating cost of crude
oil.211
Deepwater’s transmission cable would plug Block Island into the
mainland power grid, but Islanders would still have to pay considerably
more for electricity than consumers on the mainland.212 The island would
be charged 1.8 times the cost of mainland electricity in order to help pay
for the cost of the transmission cable.213 Even at this inflated rate,
however, the local Electric Utility Task Group (“EUTG”) estimated that
the overall cost of electricity on the island would fall by 40%, dropping
from 54 cents/kWh at current fuel charges to 31 cents/kWh.214 Typical
residential customers would save $140 per month, and the Town of New
Shoreham itself would realize about $120,000 in annual savings on its
electric bill.215
208

Alex Kuffner, Ruin the View?, PROVIDENCE J., Mar. 7, 2010, at 1.
Judy Benson, Wind Farm Controversy Buffets Tiny Block Island, THE DAY (May 27, 2012,
12:00 AM), http://www.theday.com/article/20120527/NWS01/305279956/1070.
210
Alex Kuffner, Block Island Divided over Wind Farm, PROVIDENCE J., July 23, 2010, at 4.
211
Letter from Elec. Util. Task Grp., to Town Council 3 (Nov. 7, 2012) [hereinafter EUTG letter],
available at http://block-island.villagesoup.com/p/letter-from-electric-utility-task-group-to-towncouncil-re-deepwater/922755 (follow “ACOECommentEUTG” hyperlink).
212
Id. at 1.
213
Dan West, Thirty Percent Savings with Wind Farm Cable, BLOCK ISLAND TIMES (July 26,
2010), http://block-island.villagesoup.com/p/Thirty-percent-savings-with-wind-farm-cable/91252.
214
EUTG letter, supra note 211, at 1.
215
Id. at 2.
209
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The EUTG also identified three different local environmental benefits
to plugging into the mainland power grid.216 First is the reduction in
emissions from obviating the need to burn one million gallons of diesel
fuel per year.217 Second is the reduction in noise from the diesel
generators.218 Finally, environmental risks from the constant transport of
diesel fuel and urea (a chemical used in emission control) would be
eliminated.219
The final benefit accruing to Block Island is better telecommunications
access through a fiber optic connection included with the transmission
cable.220 Fiber optic internet connections would be a massive upgrade over
the much-maligned Verizon DSL internet upon which the Island currently
relies.221
For Block Island residents and homeowners, these benefits are
weighed against the aesthetics of adding wind turbines to otherwise
pristine ocean views. While aesthetics are inherently difficult to quantify,
there is a valid concern that the properties overlooking the Wind Farm will
decline in value. Since offshore wind is a nascent industry in the United
States, predicting its effects on real estate is a problematic exercise. Some
professional analyses and anecdotal evidence indicate adverse effects on
property values in proximity to wind farms,222 while other studies found
the evidence to be deficient.223
One resident pointed out that if $250 million worth of property with
views of the Wind Farm (a conservative estimate) declined by 10%, this
$25 million dollar loss would have to be weighed against electricity
savings for residential customers.224 But even if a dollar figure like this
216

Id. at 3.
Id.
218
Id.
219
Id.
220
Turaj, Fiber Optics Now Part of Deepwater Cable, supra note 201.
221
See id. (“Several members of the public stepped up to voice concerns over Verizon [I]nternet
speeds, complaining that they continue to get slower.”).
222
See DO WIND PROJECTS ADVERSELY AFFECT PROXIMATE RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY VALUES?,
http://www.northnet.org/brvmug/WindPower/RealEstate.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2013) (listing
studies and commentary about the adverse effects of wind energy projects on home values).
223
See BEN HOEN ET AL., THE IMPACT OF WIND POWER PROJECTS ON RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY
VALUES IN THE UNITED STATES: A MULTI-SITE HEDONIC ANALYSIS, at iii (2009), available at
http://eetd.lbl.gov/ea/ems/reports/lbnl-2829e.pdf?loc=interstitialskip (“[N]one of the models uncovers
conclusive evidence of the existence of any widespread property value impacts that might be present in
communities surrounding wind energy facilities.”); GEORGE STERZINGER ET AL., THE EFFECT OF WIND
DEVELOPMENT
ON
LOCAL
PROPERTY
VALUES
9
(2003),
available
at
http://www.repp.org/articles/static/1/binaries/wind_online_final.pdf (“The results of this analysis of
property sales . . . suggest that there is no support for the claim that wind development will harm
property values.”).
224
Mike Hickey, Letter to the Editor, Windfarm: A Dollar a Day?, BLOCK ISLAND TIMES (Sept.
28, 2009), http://block-island.villagesoup.com/p/Featured-Letter-Windfarm-A-dollar-a-day/89833.
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could be agreed upon, the cost-benefit analysis still depends largely on the
individual. Property values aside, wind farms are not universally
condemned as eyesores detracting from natural aesthetics; some people
may even find them attractive reminders of forward-thinking green energy
production.225 Moreover, the electricity cost savings may be more or less
important to people based on their economic means; a wealthy person may
not be persuaded to compromise viewsheds regardless of cost, while
someone struggling to pay their bills will likely be more grateful for the
financial relief.
B. Mainland Rhode Islanders
Ultimately, the short-term effects of the Block Island Wind Farm at the
local level will vary widely between individuals. But residents and
businesses in mainland Rhode Island have more uniform interests at stake.
Unlike people on Block Island, their electricity rates will actually increase
as a result of the Wind Farm and its PPA. On the other hand, there is no
aesthetic obstruction to worry about, as the turbines will not be visible
from the mainland. Therefore, for mainland Rhode Islanders, the
Deepwater Wind debate boils down to weighing more expensive electricity
against the potential for cleaner energy and economic development.
In evaluating and rejecting the 2009 version of the PPA, the PUC
based its decision on an estimate that the energy from the Block Island
Wind Farm would cost $390 million more over the duration of the twentyyear contract than traditional market-priced energy.226 A typical residential
customer would incur a 1.7% increase in their electric bill during the first
year of the contract;227 assuming electricity usage of 500 kWh per month,
this would equal $1.35 per month.228 Business and industrial firms using
much greater amounts of electricity would inevitably be hit harder, which
is why Rhode Island manufacturing firms Toray Plastics America and
Polytop Corporation fought so hard against the PPA. Toray and Polytop
face expected rate increases of $287,000 and $42,000, respectively.229
225
See Justin Good, The Aesthetics of Wind Energy, 13 HUMAN ECOLOGY REV. 76, 76 (2006)
(“Some people are literally mesmerized by wind turbines, as much by the hypnotic motion of the blades
as by the ecologically-satisfying idea of wind turbines as sources of clean and renewable energy.
Others are literally repulsed by their industrially-constructed look, and even by their very presence as a
visual intrusion on the natural amenity of the landscape.”).
226
In re Proposed Town of New Shoreham Project, 25 A.3d 482, 493 (R.I. 2011).
227
Review of Amended Power Purchase Agreement Between Narragansett Elec. Co. &
Deepwater Wind Block Island, LLC, Docket No. 4185, 2010 WL 3458306, at *50 (R.I.P.U.C. Aug. 16,
2010).
228
Town of New Shoreham Project, 280 P.U.R.4th 185, 190 (R.I.P.U.C. Apr. 2, 2010), order
corrected 2010 WL 2719959 (R.I.P.U.C. Apr. 5, 2010).
229
Review of Amended Power Purchase Agreement Between Narragansett Elec. Co. &
Deepwater Wind Block Island, 2010 WL 3458306, at *5.
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In exchange for these increased electricity bills, the Block Island Wind
Farm is meant to provide both environmental and economic benefits.
Unfortunately, in the short term, these benefits appear to fall well short of
Governor Carcieri’s lofty expectations. It is possible that the second-stage,
larger-scale Deepwater Wind Energy Center could one day deliver much
greater benefits to Rhode Island, but for now, Rhode Islanders are likely to
be underwhelmed by the return generated by their marginally increased
utility bills.
On the environmental side, wind energy’s cleanliness has always been
its most salient selling point. Once the turbines are constructed and
spinning, the Block Island Wind Farm will not produce pollution or
greenhouse gas emissions.230 At the state level, the energy produced by the
Block Island Wind Farm will offset energy that would have otherwise
come from fossil fuels. Currently, 97% of Rhode Island’s electric power
generation comes from natural gas.231 This is significant because natural
gas is relatively clean burning compared to other fossil fuels, with only
55% of the carbon content for coal and 70% of that for oil.232 Therefore,
the actual greenhouse gas offset from the Block Island Wind Farm is
proportionally lessened in that it will replace natural gas power rather than
coal or oil.233
In economic terms, the Block Island Wind Farm has thus far
dramatically failed to live up to its initial expectations. In 2009, Governor
Carcieri claimed that the project would “create a minimum of 800 jobs
with annual wages of $60 million.”234 But when the PUC examined the
PPA, they initially rejected it partly on the basis that the Block Island Wind
Farm would create only thirty-five to fifty temporary jobs and six

230
The Opportunity, DEEPWATER WIND, http://dwwind.com/about/the-opportunity (last visited
Jan. 31, 2013).
231
See Energy Efficiency & Renewable Energy in My State: Rhode Island, U.S. DEP’T OF
ENERGY, http://apps1.eere.energy.gov/states/electricity_generation.cfm/state=RI (last visited Jan. 31,
2013) (charting fuel sources for electric power generation).
232
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. OFFICE OF OIL AND GAS, NATURAL GAS 1998: ISSUES AND TRENDS, at
xvi, 3 (1999), available at http://www.eia.gov/pub/oil_gas/natural_gas/analysis_publications/natural_g
as_1998_issues_trends/pdf/it98.pdf.
233
The need to burn diesel fuel to provide power on Block Island will be obviated by the Wind
Farm, but the Island itself will only use about 10% of the power generated, with the 90% remainder
being exported to the mainland. Block Island Wind Farm Fact Sheet, DEEPWATER WIND,
http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=27&ved=0CF8QFjAGOBQ&ur
l=http%3A%2F%2Fdwwind.com%2Ffile_download%2F167%2FBIWF%2BFact%2BSheet%2B07011
1.pdf&ei=Cvi8UOiuJLK30gGny4HYBA&usg=AFQjCNEElI6yCqOcPzuE5DHgBmMigIVezA (last
visited Feb. 11, 2013).
234
Governor Carcieri Hails Deepwater Wind Rhode Island Lease Agreement at Quonset Business
Park, R.I. ECON. DEV. CORP. (June 30, 2009), http://www.riedc.com/news/2009/06/deep-water-windquonset.
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235

permanent ones. Moreover, the PUC lamented the potential loss of jobs
that could accompany a spike in electricity rates:
It is basic economics to know that the more money a business
spends on energy, whether it is renewable or fossil based, and
whether it is produced in Rhode Island or elsewhere, the less
Rhode Island businesses can spend or invest, and the more
likely existing jobs will be lost to pay for these higher costs.
Spending large amounts of ratepayer funds on renewable
energy development can lead to green jobs at new businesses,
but one cannot ignore the fact that higher energy costs could
lead to the loss of regular jobs at existing business as well.236
In summary, the short-term environmental and economic benefits to
mainland Rhode Island are underwhelming compared to Governor
Carcieri’s enthusiastic rhetoric. In the long run, however, Deepwater may
have further opportunities to make a much bigger environmental and
economic impact.
C. The Block Island Wind Farm as a Demonstration Project
In the short term, Block Island is set to benefit economically at the
subjectively-valued price of compromised ocean views, while mainland
Rhode Islanders anticipate increased electricity rates for dubious economic
and environmental benefits. But, as a demonstration project, the Block
Island Wind Farm is likely to have much greater longer-term consequences
by serving as a model for future offshore wind farm development in the
northeastern United States.
Deepwater Wind is already planning a “second generation” of offshore
wind farms, including the Deepwater Wind Energy Center, 150 to 200
turbines located further offshore, about 15 miles southeast of Block
Island,237 and the Hudson Canyon Wind Farm, another 200 turbines 35
miles south of Long Island.238 These much larger projects have the
potential to displace far more fossil-fuel greenhouse gas emissions than the
Block Island Wind Farm239 and, because of economies of scale, would

235
Town of New Shoreham Project, 280 P.U.R.4th 185, 216 (R.I.P.U.C. Apr. 2, 2010), order
amended, No. 4111, 2010 WL 2719959 (R.I.P.U.C. Apr. 5, 2010).
236
Id. at 217.
237
Deepwater Wind Energy Center, supra note 1.
238
Hudson Canyon Wind Farm, DEEPWATER WIND, http://dwwind.com/hudson-canyon/hudsoncanyon-project-overview (last visited Jan. 31, 2013).
239
See id. (noting that Hudson Canyon will displace more than 1.7 million tons of carbon dioxide
emissions each year); Deepwater Energy Center, supra note 1 (stating that the Deepwater Wind Energy
Center will displace more than 1.7 million tons of carbon dioxide emissions each year).

2013]

SECOND WIND

1487

240

produce cheaper electricity. If the Block Island Wind Farm is
successful, Deepwater’s experience with building the Wind Farm and
navigating federal and state politics and regulations will give it a strong
competitive advantage,241 and with the utility-scale wind farms could come
the permanent jobs that have yet to materialize in Rhode Island.
But the Block Island Wind Farm has policy implications beyond
serving as a physical model for larger projects. The most controversial
aspect of the Wind Farm is how the Rhode Island government has forced
the project through the regulatory process with official state sponsorship
and narrowly tailored legislation, and the way this has benefitted one
particular for-profit company. A crucial question is whether this should
serve as a model for other states looking to kick-start renewable energy
development.
Based on the rampant controversy and fierce litigation surrounding the
project, it appears that, at the very least, the project could have been
conceived and executed much more effectively at the state level. In
retrospect, the biggest mistake was in the way Rhode Island sought a
specific “partner” for wind energy development.242 Instead of assigning
exclusive rights to one company to develop a wind farm,243 the state could
have preserved an element of competition by passing strong pro-wind
energy legislation that could benefit multiple developers. By preserving a
competitive marketplace for multiple renewable energy firms, electricity
distributors would have actual options to choose from, and could select
their own partners based on price rather than litigating over the
interpretation of “commercially reasonable.” Moreover, public sentiment
would remain more favorable, because even if/when ratepayers ended up
paying more for electricity, it would seem less like “an inside deal . . . to
specifically guarantee one company’s revenues and profits.”244
On the other hand, freer negotiations between multiple developers
240
Deepwater Wind Submits Plan for Nation’s First Regional Offshore Wind Farm to Supply
Multiple East Coast States, DEEPWATER WIND, http://dwwind.com/news/deepwater-wind-submitsplan-for-nation-s-first-regional-offshore-wind-farm-to-supply-multiple-east-coast-states (last visited
Jan. 31, 2013).
241
See Scott DiSavino, Deepwater to Build First U.S. Offshore Wind Farm, REUTERS (Oct. 3,
2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/03/us-deepwater-wind-idUSBRE8920ZX20121003
(“‘With Block Island we are gaining real-time information on what it will cost to build the bigger
project. That is a huge competitive advantage as we look to transition to the 1,000-MW (Deepwater
Wind Energy Center) we are hoping to build in federal waters,’ [Deepwater Wind CEO Bill] Moore
said. . . . ‘There are other companies interested in that federal lease, but we have an advantage because
of our prior selection by Rhode Island as their preferred developer . . . .’”).
242
Timothy C. Barmann, Wind Farm Gathers Steam—Rhode Island Seeks Private Partner for
Project, PROVIDENCE J., Apr. 4, 2008, at F1.
243
Timothy C. Barmann, N.J. Firm Picked to Build State’s Wind Farm, PROVIDENCE J., Sept. 25,
2008, at 1.
244
Tracy Breton, Outgoing Lynch Urges Groups to Fight Wind-Farm Project, PROVIDENCE J.,
Jan. 4, 2011, at 5.
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would likely take longer, and projects might be more likely to hit snags in
the regulatory process without the express support of the state. But
ultimately, shifts in energy policy cannot be expected to happen as quickly
as Governor Carcieri anticipated in Rhode Island. In its rush to get steel in
the water, Rhode Island managed to alienate the rate-paying public and
likely ended up with more expensive energy than if it had acted more
deliberately.
D. Renewable Energy Regulatory Reform
As a demonstration project in a nascent industry, the Block Island
Wind Farm will have long-term implications for offshore wind energy in
the United States. If this industry emerges as Deepwater expects, state and
federal regulatory schemes may adapt their own permitting processes in the
interest of efficiency and precision. Also, applicants for permits will seek
out the most cost-effective and efficient ways of securing permits from
multiple agencies.
Projects on the scale of the Block Island Wind Farm are always going
to involve complex permitting processes. But some of these frameworks
are already being streamlined and adjusted as they evolve and are applied
to new projects.
One example is the USACE and the BOEM combining their NEPA
process245 and therefore avoiding bureaucratic redundancy. This type of
interagency cooperation can even bridge federal and state regulatory
systems; recently, the USACE extended its commenting deadline in part to
more closely “coincide with the public notice comment periods of both the
Rhode Island Coastal Resources Management Council and the Rhode
Concurrent
Island Department of Environmental Management.”246
comment periods involving multiple agencies are a relatively easy way to
simplify the administrative process and to ensure that all public comments
are received and considered by all of the agencies involved.
Future offshore wind projects planned by Deepwater Wind will also be
simplified by their location; the Deepwater Wind Energy Center247 and the
Hudson Canyon Wind Farm248 will be located in federal waters,
eliminating the need for permits from state agencies like the CRMC for the
turbines themselves. Instead, these wind farms will be under the
jurisdiction of the BOEM.
245

Notice of Determination of No Competitive Interest, 77 Fed. Reg. 47,092, 47,092 (Aug. 7,

2012).
246
Press Release, U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, Public Comment Period Extended to Feb. 10 on
Deepwater Wind Proposal to Build Wind Turbines off Block Island Coast (Dec. 19, 2012), available at
http://www.nae.usace.army.mil/news/12/2012-127.pdf.
247
Deepwater Wind Energy Center, supra note 1.
248
Hudson Canyon Wind Farm, supra note 238.
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The BOEM, formerly the Minerals Management Service, has
undergone substantial recent reorganization to keep up with development
of offshore resources.249 The agency has already instituted an initiative to
facilitate new offshore wind projects by expediting the offshore leasing
process. Specifically, BOEM initiated revisions to the offshore leasing
process by eliminating a redundant step when only one developer
expresses interest in a lease area.250 This reform was part of Secretary of
the Interior Ken Salazar’s “Smart from the Start” initiative designed to
spur “rapid and responsible” wind energy development off the Atlantic
coast.251
Deepwater itself has also simplified its permitting process by using one
comprehensive Environmental Report/Construction and Operations Plan
that has been submitted to multiple agencies and is available for review on
Deepwater’s website.252 The report was prepared by Tetra Tech, an
international provider of environmental and energy consulting services.253
This report can serve as a model for other companies undertaking
renewable energy projects—namely, it may be easiest to hire an outside
consultant to prepare one comprehensive document rather than put together
separate more narrowly tailored packets of information for submission to
different agencies.
V. CONCLUSION
In the long run, Rhode Island’s rocky beginning in renewable energy
may someday be forgotten if larger-scale wind farms trim the costs and
create more jobs. But for now, the Block Island Wind Farm’s
controversial state-sponsored journey through the legislative and
regulatory process should serve as a cautionary tale to policymakers in
other states: by pushing and rushing an otherwise untenable and
anticompetitive project through the legal and regulatory system, you risk
alienating your constituencies and raising electricity costs.
At the federal level, Deepwater Wind is fortunate to be working within
249
Reorganization of the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement,
BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., REGULATION AND ENFORCEMENT, http://www.boemre.gov/ (last
visited Jan. 31, 2013).
250
Press Release, Bureau of Ocean Energy Mgmt., Regulation & Enforcement, Fact Sheet:
Revisions
to
Offshore
Renewable
Energy
Regulations
(2010),
available
at
http://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/loader.cfm?csModule=security/getfile&PageID=73318’.
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an evolving regulatory framework designed specifically to accommodate
offshore wind energy development. While the wisdom of renewable
energy tax credits can be debated and will impact the take-home
profitability of such projects, the evolution of the nuts-and-bolts regulatory
process is a less controversial, more practical companion to the emerging
industry.

